Hop
70 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
70 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# ADR 0001: Use Gitea as the forge foundation
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- Status: Accepted
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- Date: 2026-07-11
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## Context
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HopWeb needs reliable Git hosting, repository permissions, users and
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organizations, review primitives, webhooks, CI integration, packages, releases,
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and administration. Rebuilding this foundation would delay the Hop-native
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workflow and create a large security and maintenance burden.
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Gitea is a mature, MIT-licensed, Go-based forge with a REST API, OAuth2 provider,
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webhooks, Git LFS, package registries, and a production-capable Actions system.
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It supports custom assets, themes, templates, and repository tabs, which are
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enough to prototype a unified Hop experience without immediately carrying a
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large source fork.
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## Decision
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Use a pinned upstream Gitea release as the forge substrate. Build Hop as a
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separate control-plane service and Hop-native web experience that integrates
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with Gitea through stable APIs, webhooks, OAuth, and Git protocols.
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Adopt a staged customization policy:
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1. configuration, branding, templates, assets, and API integration;
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2. small upstreamable extension points where integration seams are missing;
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3. a shallow maintained fork only for essential Hop-native behavior.
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Hop domain data will live outside the Gitea schema. Cross-service operations
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will use stable IDs, idempotency keys, and explicit reconciliation rather than
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distributed database writes.
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## Consequences
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### Positive
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- The team can focus on Hop's state model and collaboration experience.
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- Standard Git clients and familiar forge features work from the beginning.
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- Gitea security fixes and features can be consumed from upstream.
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- A separable control plane makes the Hop model portable to another Git host.
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### Costs and risks
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- A visually unified product must compose two service boundaries.
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- Some acceptance operations need careful compensation and reconciliation.
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- Template overrides are version-sensitive.
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- A deep fork would make upstream upgrades expensive.
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- Public multi-tenant runners require a stronger isolation model than Gitea's
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default trusted-runner assumptions.
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## Guardrails
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- Pin exact Gitea versions and test upgrades in automation.
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- Keep a patch ledger for every source-level deviation from upstream.
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- Never edit vendored Gitea code for branding alone.
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- Prefer contributing generic extension points upstream.
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- Keep the Hop control plane independently testable and deployable.
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- Threat-model Git hooks, webhooks, runner registration, job tokens, and
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untrusted repository content before supporting public execution.
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## Revisit when
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- Gitea's architecture prevents a core Hop invariant;
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- the source patch set grows beyond a routinely rebaseable size;
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- transactional acceptance cannot be made reliable across the boundary; or
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- operating two services costs more than owning a cohesive fork.
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